

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**Routing Slip**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X (w/o att)		
2	DDCI		X (" ")		
3	EXDIR		X (" ")		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
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SUSPENSE		<div style="border: 1px solid black; border-radius: 50%; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> 19 March Date </div>			

Remarks:

Please prepare acknowledgment for
DCI's signature.

Executive Secretary

16 March 1982

Date

3637 (10-81)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence *Jim*

Bob:

We have to be careful that Olmer doesn't
overload the wires.

C
William J. Casey

Date 20 March 1982



52 1 MAR
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Under Secretary for International Trade
Washington, D.C. 20230

Executive Registry

82-0037/4

MAR 15 1982

The Honorable William Casey
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

The CIA's assistance in working toward the COCOM High-level Meeting (HLM) helped to make it a success in providing the political guidance and direction needed to alter the course of the multilateral controls system. Now your help is vital to us once again as we review the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) prepared by the Department of Defense.

As you know, one result of the HLM was that member countries agreed on the need to determine "critical" equipment and technologies and to decontrol non-sensitive end-products. The Department of Defense has recently submitted the MCTL to us for a foreign availability assessment and incorporation into the Commodity Control List.

In order to convince our business community and our COCOM partners to cooperate in restraining technology flow to the Eastern Bloc we need to make a strong case that to do otherwise poses a serious threat to our mutual security.

I would like to anticipate the arguments which may be raised by those who oppose controls or who will be skeptical as to their utility. In particular, we need assessments of: (1) the extent to which foreign availability would offset COCOM controls, and, (2) the advantage derived from the transfer of critical technology relative to the state of technology present in COCOM countries.

The Agency has the expertise to evaluate these issues. I would recommend that the Agency, perhaps headed by the newly formed Technology Transfer Assessment Center, review the MCTL in terms of these two questions I have identified. I believe that only the intelligence community has the resources and information to do a thorough analysis in this area.

Sincerely,

Lionel H. Olmer



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